

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11  
TRSE-00 MCT-01 /067 W  
-----049228 172028Z /43  
R 171500Z APR 78  
FM AMCONSUL MILAN  
TO AMEMBASSY ROME  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5952

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MILAN 0590

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: IT PINT  
SUBJECT: GIORGIO GALLI ON DC-PCI RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR MET APRIL 13 AT CONSULATE WITH GIORGIO GALLI, LEFT WING PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT STATE UNIVERSITY, POLITICAL COMUMNIST NOW WRITING FOR PANORAMA, FORMER COMMUNIST, AUTHOR OF ITALY'S MOST AUTHORITATIVE HISTORY OF PCI, PERHAPS ITALY'S MOST INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL SCIENTIST. I HAVE KNOWN GALLI SINCE EARLY FIFTIES AND HAVE FOUND HIM HONEST, UNQUESTIONABLY DEVOTED TO WESTERN DEMOCRACY AND ONE OF BEST INFORMED OF ITALIAN POLITICAL OBSERVERS. GALLI WAS DEPRESSED AT EVIDENT WEAKNESS OF ITALIAN STATE IN WAKE OF MORO KIDNAPPING, FAVORABLE TO EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT, AND WORRIED ABOUT HISTORIC COMPROMISE. HE THOUGHT THAT DC, AIDED UNWITTINGLY BY US, WAS SLIDING INTO INDISCRIMINATE COLLABORATION WITH COMMUNISTS WHICH WOULD BE HARD TO UNDO. END SUMM.

2. GALLI THOUGHT MORO AFFAIR WAS CAUSE FOR GREAT PESSIMISM ABOUT FUNCTIONING OF ITALIAN STATE, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT FEEL THAT MORO HIMSELF HAD DECISIVE PERSONAL ROLE IN FUTURE OF DC-PCI RELATIONS. WHEN MORO WAS KIDNAPPED, GALLI'S IMPRESSION HAD BEEN THAT RED BRIGADES HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES POWERFULLY EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF PLANNING AND EXECUTING NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE COUP. NOW, AS  
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FULL LIST OF POOR PREPARATIONS AND BLUNDERING REACTIONS ON PART OF ITALIAN AUTHORITIES CAME TO LIGHT, IT WAS APPARENT THAT BR'S SUCCESS DUE NOT TO TERRORISTS' SUPERIORITY BUT TO STATE'S WOEFUL INADEQUANCIES. THERE WAS NO COMFORT TO BE DRAWN FROM COMPARISONS WITH SCHLEYER KIDNAPPING IN GERMANY OR PATTY HEARST AFFAIR IN US, WHERE AUTHORITIES WERE ALSO LESS THAN EFFECTIVE. THOSE WERE SUDDEN OUTBREAKS. MORO

KIDNAPPING WAS ONE OF CHAIN OF SERIOUS CRIMES BY GANG WHOSE IDENTITY AND AIMS WERE WELL KNOWN. AND STILL RIGHT PRECAUTIONS HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN.

3. GOVERNMENT, THEREFORE, WAS SHOCKINGLY WEAK. IF EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DESIREABLE BEFORE MORO AFFAIR - AND IT HAD BEEN IN GALLI'S VIEW - IT WAS MORE THAN EVER NECESSARY NOW.

4. WHAT WAS POLITICAL EFFECT OF MORO KIDNAPPING ? GALLI'S REPLY WAS FORECEFUL AND UNEQUIVOCAL. EFFECT WAS TO HAVE SEVERELY DISORIENTED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND GIVEN COMMUNISTS UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO STEP IN AS GUARANTOR OF STATE'S STABILITY. NO MATTER THAT ALREADY AMBIGUOUS GOVERNING FORMULA HAD NOT BEEN ALTERED. REALITY HAD CHANGED DRAMATICALLY.

5. GALLI EXPLAINED. PCI HAD BECOME ONLY SOLID POINT IN TURBULENT ATMOSPHERE AFTER MORO EPISODE BEGAN. THEY HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN POSITION OPPOSED TO BARGAINING FOR MORO AND PRESSED THIS ON DIVIDED DC. THEY HAD CALLED FOR EMERGENCY MEETING OF PARTY GOILEADERS WHO AGREED TO PUSH NEW GOVERNMENT THROUGH PARLIAMENT WITHOUT DEBATE TO DEMONSTRATE UNITY OF PARTIES. THEY AND UNIONS ORGANIZED PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS, TO WHICH DC, PSI AND OTHERS MADE ONLY MARGINAL CONTRIBUTION WHICH RE-INFORCED IMAGE OF MASSIVE REJECTION OF TERRORISTS. CONFIDENTIAL

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IT WAS THEY WHO TOOK INITIATIVE TO KEEP PARLIAMENTARY WORK GOING TO SHOW THAT STATE WAS NOT PARALYZED BY TERRORISTS. TPCI HAD ASSUMED DE FACTO LEADERSHIP OF COUNTRY AT TIME OF GREAT CRISIS WHEN DC LARGELY PARALYZED.

6. EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT PHENOMENON WAS OCCURING AT MOMENT, SAID GALLI, IN FORM OF ABORTION LEGISLATION PASSAGE. DC HAD OPPOSED ABORTION LIBERALIZATION FOR FOUR YEARS. ABORTION FOR CATHOLICS WAS MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE THAN DIVORCE AND ITALIANS MIGHT REJECT IT IF REFERENDUM WERE HELD, WHICH WAS ONE REASON WHY PCI WANTED TO AVOID ONE. NONETHELESS, DC WAS STANDING ASIDE WHILE PCI STEERED NEW LEGISLATION THROUGH, OPPOSED BY ONLY HANDFUL OF RADICALS.

7. DC, IN OTHER WORDS, WAS PRACTICALLY IMMOBILIZED BY PREOCCUPATION WITH MORO. AT SAME TIME, NEVER HAD PARLIAMENT SEEN SUCH FEVERISH AND PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY. IT WAS DUE TO COMMUNISTS CONSCIOUSLY ACTING TO HOLD STATE TOGETHER.

8. THIS COULD EASILY GO TOO FAR, ACCORDING TO GALLI. LAMA'S STATEMENT THAT VIGILANCE OF 100,000 WORKERS WAS ALL THAT WAS NEEDED TO COPE WITH RED BRIGADES WAS DISQUIETING. THOSE

WORKERS WERE ALL COMMUNISTS. LAMA'S STATEMENT THUS AMOUNTED TO CALL FOR A PARTY TO ASSUME FUNCTIONS THAT BELONGED TO STATE ALONE. THAT GALLI COULD NOT ACCEPT.

9. DID GALLI EXPECT PCI TO BE ADMITTED TO CABINET? HE DID NOT. THE COMMUNISTS WERE NOT ASKING THAT AND KNEW THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE TO MAKE COOPERATION WITH THE DC MORE DIFFICULT AT A MOMENT THAT IT WANTED TO PROMOTE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY.

10. WHAT WERE CHANCES THAT DC COULD BOUNCE BACK? IT WAS FAIRLY CLEAR, SAID AMBASSADOR, THAT YOUNGER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WERE MORE OPPOSED TO COLLABORATION WITH PCI THAN OLD GUARD. WHAT WERE POSSIBILITIES THAT DC WOULD NOW REPLACE EXISTING LEADERSHIP WITH YOUNGER MEN?  
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TRSE-00 MCT-01 /067 W  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MILAN 0590

11. ANYTHING, SIGHED, GALLI, IS POSSIBLE. PSI, IN FACT, WAS DOING JUST THAT. WITH ALL THEIR PROBLEMS, SOCIALISTS AT LEAST HAD NEW, YOUNGER LEADERSHIP THAT OFFERED PROMISE OF SOMETHING BETTER. AND CHANGE FOR PSI WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN FOR DC, WHICH WAS FIRMLY ANCHORED TO ITALIAN SOCIETY IN WAY PSI WAS NOT. NONETHELESS, CONCLUDED GALLI, SIGNS OF DC OLD GUARD WILLINGNESS TO STEP ASIDE WERE FEW.

12. BUT DC, SAID GALLI, WAS NOT ONLY LACKING VIGOROUS

YOUNGER LEADERSHIP. PARTY WAS ALSO BOUND TO STRATEGY - OF WHICH MORO HAD BEEN PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT - THAT WAS FUNDAMENTALLY AMBIGUOUS AND THUS UNFIT TO PROMOTE CLEAR CHOICE TO WHICH VOTERS HAD RIGHT. AMBIGUITY PERMEATED NOT ONLY FORMULA (PCI IN PROGRAM MAJORITY BUT NOT POLITICAL MAJORITY) BUT ALSO REALITY. DC WAS TELLING VOTERS IT WAS REJECTING HISTORIC COMPROMISE BUT AT SAME TIME WAS IN FACT COLLABORATING CLOSELY AND INDISCRIMINATELY WITH COMMUNISTS. BASIS OF THAT COLLABORATION WAS DC CALCULATED RISK THAT PCI APPEAL WOULD DIMINISH - AS THAT OF SOCIALISTS HAD DONE - AS PARTY DRAWN CLOSER TO POWER.

13. THIS WAS WRONG STRATEGY FOR DC, ACCORDING TO GALLI. HE AGREED THAT HISTORIC COMPROMISE WOULD BE DISASTER FOR ITALY BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAVE NO OPPOSITION. BUT THIS WAS NOT WAY TO CONFIDENTIAL

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AVOID IT. FIRST OF ALL, COMMUNISTS WERE NOT SOCIALISTS AND WERE NOT LIKELY TO COMMIT SAME BLUNDERS. SECOND, DC WOULD WIN MORE RESPECT AMONG ITS OWN VOTERS BY BEING CLEAR ABOUT ITS OPPOSITION TO HISTORIC COMPROMISE. PARTY SHOULD LIMIT ITS COOPERATION WITH PCI TO AN EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT WITH PRECISE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS FOR A PRECISE PERIOD OF TIME. IT IT SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT AT END OF LIMITED PERIOD COUNTRY MUST RETURN TO MAJORITY/MINORITY SYSTEM THAT IS LIFEBLOOD OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES AND THAT ELECTORATE WOULD THEN HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN IT AND PCI.

14. AND WHAT DID GALLI THINK OF US POLICY TOWARD ITALY? HE FELT IT WAS UNHELPFUL. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NO AMERICAN PRESIDENT COULD ENDORSE COMMUNISTS PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. BUT IN ACTIVELY OPPOSING ENTRY OF PCI, US WAS PREVENTING ITALIANS FROM CREATING GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH NATIONS TERRIBLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. CERTAINLY IT WAS RISK TO ACCEPT COMMUNISTS INTO GOVERNMENT. BUT THAT WAS LESS RISKY THAN PROSPECT OF CONTINUED SOCIAL DETERIORATION IN THEIR ABSENCE OR WORSE, COMMUNIST OPPOSITION WHICH WOULD INSTANTLY BRING ITALY TO ITS KNEES.

15. MOROOVER, SAID GALLI, US POLICY ENCOURAGED DC TO CONTINUE BEING AMBIGUOUS ABOUT RELATIONSHIP WITH PCI. DC WAS TELLING COMMUNISTS IT WOULD LIKE TO DEAL WITH THEM BUT COULDN'T BECAUSE OF AMERICANS, JUST AS IT WAS TELLING AMERICANS IT WOULD LIKE TO STEER CONSERVATIVE COURSE BUT COULDN'T BECAUSE OF COMMUNISTS. US POLICY, IN OTHER WORDS, ALLOWED DC TO PRESENT ITS OPPOSITION TO PCI NOT AS POLICY PURSUED OUT OF CONVICTION BUT AS ONE IMPOSED UPON IT BY AMERICANS. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WERE AT ONCE HANGING THEIR ANTI-COMMUNISM ON VERY WEAK REED AND PRTRAYING ITALY AS UNDIGNIFIED DEPENDENT OF US. US OUGHT INSTEAD TO FORCE DC TO STAND ON ITS OWN AND ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS POLICIES.

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16. AMBASSADOR NOTED AT THIS POINT THAT WE HAD GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS NOT TO INTERVENE IN ITALIAN AFFAIRS. FOR MONTHS IN FACT AFTER AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL HERE WE HAD SPOKEN IN LOW KEY IN RESPONSE TO MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF OUR POSITION AS BENEVOLENT ONE TOWARDS COMMUNISTS. SINCE THAT DIDN'T WORK, WE REPEATED OUR POSITION FORCEFULLY. WE MADE CLEAR THAT ITALIANS WERE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE WHOSE POLITICAL CHOICES WERE THEIRS AND THEIRS ALONE. BUT WE TOO WERE SOVEREIGN COUNTRY WITH RIGHT AND INDEED OBLIGATION TO STATE CLEARLY WITH WHAT KIND OF COUNTRY WE WISHED TO ALLY OURSELVES. WE HAD DONE THAT AND NO MORE.

17. GALLI LEFT WITH PROMISE TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH AMBASSADOR, WHETHER IN ROME OR IN ANOTHER OCCASION IN MILAN.FINA

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## Message Attributes

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**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014